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The backers of the controversial .xxx domain have negotiated a new con-
tract with ICANN. Final approval of the contract is still vehemently opposed 
by an amusing alliance of anti-pornography conservatives and pornogra-
phers with investments in existing adult domain names. Nevertheless, 
chances are now good that it will finally succeed in gaining the approval of 
the ICANN Board.1  
What are the implications of this probable resolution of the .xxx drama for 
the Internet and Internet governance? They are major. But no one seems to 
be talking about them.  
Let’s begin with the most direct implication. The .xxx contract sets an impor-
tant precedent by giving ICANN policy making and enforcement responsibil-
ity over web site content. The .xxx bid managed to survive ICANN's long and 
embarrassingly arbitrary process by surrendering to the desire of govern-
ments to impose regulations, taxes and conditions on ICM Registry’s desire 
to establish a space for adult content on the web. Take a look at some of 
the things ICM Registry had to agree to do to be able to register a three-
letter string in the top level of DNS: 
1. Prohibit child pornography. No one disputes this, but child pornography 
is already totally illegal globally, with all major jurisdictions prosecuting it 
vigorously and national laws reinforced by bans in global instruments 
such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. So why are we using 
an ICANN registry contract as a redundant global legislator? 
2.  The registry is required to engage independent third parties, such as the 
Internet Watch Foundation, to proactively monitor registrant compliance 
with registry policies. ICANN retains the right to disapprove ICM's choice 
of monitoring service providers; thus we can add to its “technical coordi-
nation” duties the selection of suitable content watchdogs. 
3. The registry must develop industry best practices designed to protect  
1 We say this for two reasons. First, ICM Registry has succeeded in altering the contract in ways that directly meets 
the objections expressed by some governments (particularly the US) and the board members who voted against it. 
It would be unconscionable, even for ICANN, to reject a contract that does exactly what the registry was asked to 
do. Second, ICANN CEO Paul Twomey was involved in the later stages of the new contract negotiations. Since the 
contract appears to meet the approval of this most-politically sensitive member of the ICANN staff, it should have 
his vote, and he should be able to bring other votes with him.  
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       children online and empower parents and other users to avoid content they       
do not wish to see.  
4. The registry must create and support an "International Forum for Online 
Responsibility," which is supposed to be a "globally representative" place 
where "all stakeholders are able to discuss and actively respond to con-
cerns about online adult entertainment," and which allows "the sponsoring 
community and other stakeholders to participate in the development, im-
plementation, and enforcement of best practices. 
5. The registry must reserve geographic and names that have religious or cul-
tural “sensitivity”; thus ICANN will be in the business of determining cul-
tural and religious boundaries on a global basis 
6. The registry must pay $10 per name per year to support child safety organi-
zations and to sponsor development of technology to enhance the ability of 
Internet users to control their online experience.  
As an ICM Registry document says, the contractual changes "substantially en-
hance ICANN's leverage over the Registry Operator throughout the life of the 
agreement." With this contract ICANN takes (another) step away from its tech-
nical coordination mandate and adds an element of content regulation to its 
policy portfolio, alongside trademark/copyright protection. 
Facing Facts about Global Governance of Internet Content  
Let’s set aside for now the issue of whether this is “good” or “bad.” It’s more 
important to start wrapping our minds around the nature of this increasingly 
entrenched global governance regime. We can’t possibly understand what is 
happening here if we try to conceive it in terms of a simple dichotomy, so com-
mon to the WSIS debates, between “more government” and “less government” 
or even “US unilateral” vs. “multilateral.” No, one must characterize the .xxx 
resolution both as a victory for governments in their quest to assert “public pol-
icy” control over ICANN, and as a defeat for the traditional intergovernmental 
process and traditional forms of governmental control. Governments got to 
“regulate” the proposed adult domain in line with their “public policy” con-
cerns, but they did it in a way that accepts ICANN’s narrow, private regime of 
regulation by contract and its strange microcosm of a multilateral forum, the 
Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). By accepting and participating in this 
resolution, governments further entrench the ICANN regime, for better or 
worse. 
And things could be worse. Some might argue that regulation of content is not 
something that should be delegated to a private sector entity to begin with. 
Content regulation, they might contend, is a public policy issue that should be 
decided in a “democratic” manner, not on the basis of ICANN's "bottom up" 
processes. But there are two problems with this line of thinking. 
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 First, it is not self-evident that Internet content regulation should be 
"democratic" at all. "Democratic" basically means the will of the majority. A 
global majority, or a collection of national governments, are not known for their 
devotion to abstract principles of tolerance and free expression. They are 
much more likely to be politically mobilized by a desire to suppress or regulate 
some kind of expression that angers or provokes them at any given moment. 
Most free expression supporters don't recognize the right of a majority to sup-
press expression they don't like simply because they are in a majority. Indeed, 
most Western countries are constitutional democracies where a wide range of 
liberal freedoms are put outside the reach of democratic majorities for pre-
cisely this reason. Unless global policy making around Internet content is in-
formed by fundamental liberal values and retains strong constitutional protec-
tions for individual human rights to free expression, the prospect of “public pol-
icy” making by national governments (or some other democratic or majority-
driven process) is highly unattractive. (This is one reason why IGP has sought a 
framework convention which would codify principled protections into Internet 
governance.) 
 
Second, most discussions of inserting “public policy” concerns into Internet 
content regulation do not take account of the heterogeneous values and insti-
tutional deficit at the global level. If regulation of content should not be dele-
gated to a private sector entity, then by process of elimination the suggestion 
is that it should be left to governments. But which governments? Which na-
tion’s culture, which nation’s "majority" will decide this? National governments 
are all limited and territorial in their scope. None of them can claim a democ-
ratic mantle at the global level. That's one of the main reasons we got a global 
private sector solution, an ICANN, to govern DNS to begin with. The ideal solu-
tion is to keep ICANN’s decisions purely coordinative and to let the policy chips 
fall where they may, to be taken up in other, more legitimate forums. But alter-
native policy forums keep failing to command the global consensus required. 
So delegation of these issues to a private sector entity continues.  
 
The ICANN process fosters dealing with policy problems in an ad hoc manner 
by taking advantage of the narrow kinds of leverage inherent in ICANN’s gate-
keeping role and contractual governance model. (It is similar to the fact that 
the U.S. got Net Neutrality regulation not through passing real legislation, 
which was too difficult, but by imposing conditions on a merger agreement.) 
Thus, although many governments and theorists complain about it, the con-
tractual approach can be seductive and self-perpetuating. It allows govern-
ments to escape many of the burdens and accountability checks of real global 
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 law and policy making. In the .xxx case, governments didn’t have to negotiate a 
generally applicable treaty about the thorny issue of what is pornography and 
what to do about it, build support for it, get it ratified, and face any electoral 
accountability. They just raised some objections and let Paul Twomey’s staff 
and ICM Registry work out the details. It is a mutual accommodation that is 
convenient for the established institutional players.  Whether it serves the 
global Internet-using public very well remains to be seen.  
 
The saving grace of the private contractual governance model is precisely its 
narrow and private scope: no one has to use this new xxx domain. One can put 
pornographic material under .com, .net, country codes, or elsewhere. It is pos-
sible that the contact regulates the domain to death; it is also possible that the 
added value of a .xxx listing will justify the huge regulatory burden imposed on 
it. Either way, subjection to its regime is more or less a matter of choice.  
Concerns for the Future 
Still, there are things what should make us uncomfortable about the way 
the .xxx controversy was resolved. Three points in particular come to mind. 
 
First, it might set a precedent for mission creep. The resolution of the .xxx con-
troversy is less objectionable if the scope of this new and heightened regula-
tory authority is limited to the .xxx domain. As noted before, no one has to 
use .xxx and there are plenty of alternatives. But if “content regulation by con-
tract” becomes a precedent that starts to get extended to other domains, then 
it is very dangerous to freedom of expression on the Internet. In particular, we 
must insist in the future that renewal of existing gTLD contracts not step into 
this territory.  
 
Second, it is a highly arbitrary and unpredictable regime. The system is analo-
gous in many ways to broadcast licensing or the early days of cable franchising 
in the U.S., where the license is considered a privilege that is conferred on 
whoever is deemed “most worthy” by a (highly politicized) public authority. In 
order to position themselves as “worthy,” supplicants for the license are re-
quired to offer various goodies, concessions, payoffs and high-sounding prom-
ises to their political masters. This problem is exacerbated by the serious lack 
of procedural formality in ICANN, and especially in the GAC. Without any rules 
or laws to determine what is within or outside the scope of governmental inter-
est, domain applications that attract the interest or opposition of virtually any 
organized group are ripe targets. We can expect additional ad hoc policy deals 
to be negotiated and additional pounds of flesh to be extracted in the future as 
Triple X, Internet 
Content 
Regulation and 
the ICANN 
Regime  
 Internet Governance Project 
 c/o School of Information Studies, Syracuse University Syracuse, NY USA 13244 
 http://internetgovernance.org 
5 
 
The Internet Governance Project (IGP) is an interdisciplinary consortium of academics with 
scholarly and practical expertise in international governance, Internet policy, and information 
and communication technology.  
 
To download its papers or to learn more about IGP, go to  
http://internetgovernance.org 
 
new TLDs are proposed. And it is worth noting that ICM Registry has survived 
this process only because it is backed by a determined and wealthy business-
man who was willing to pay over $2 million in legal fees and was capable of 
making a credible threat to drag ICANN through the courts if need be.  
 
Third, we must never forget, or allow the world to forget, that the .xxx applica-
tion proved conclusively that the U.S. government can and will use (or abuse) 
its special powers as ICANN’s sole political oversight authority when domestic 
political pressures make it politically profitable to do so.  
 
The Internet Governance Project has long maintained that ICM's .xxx applica-
tion deserved to be successful. We took this position because we don't believe 
ICANN should discriminate among TLD applications on the basis of the content 
or meaning of the string, and because we believe that ICANN (and its oversight 
authority, the US Government) should not arbitrarily change the rules in the 
middle of the game. If there are problems here, they are not problems with 
the .xxx gTLD application. They are problems inherent in ICANN’s institutional 
structure.  
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